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Abstract:
The paper describes the emergence of entrepreneurship in Shanxi province based on fieldwork in the
last 6 years. Employing institutional and evolutionary economics shows that both the kind of firms that
emerge and the individual behaviour of entrepreneurs reflect a systematic response to the situational
constraint all would-be entrepreneurs face, namely a high level of uncertainty and weak institutions. In
this situation to establish firms with a weak organisational identity allows to flexibly respond to new
opportunities, while a strong reputation for accountability of the owners and managers is needed to get
long term business relations started. As the Shanxi sample shows accountability can be achieved by a
mix of reviving old economic institutions, hijacking social organisations, and building new business
practices. To the extent that old institutions, social organisations and business practices do not spread
equally across China, different forms of firms and different forms of entrepreneurship can be expected
within China. In short, local cultures matter.
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2INTRODUCTION
Institutional and evolutionary economics have argued for some time that the "immediate determinants"
of growth, such as productivity or investment are not enough for explaining the economic development
of a country. Instead the organisation of firms, and the firm‘s response to risk or policy changes are
crucial when it comes to exploiting resources, market chances and technical advances1. Thus, for
example the success of China's economic reforms is based on Chinese entrepreneurship, rather than on
an increase in total factor productivity2. New ways needed to be found for co-ordinating commercial
activities “outside the plan”, amongst which the establishment of (non-state) firms was certainly one of
the most challenging tasks. Subsequently, the empirical question in what follows focuses on the
establishment and functioning of new firms, their interaction and their response to the business
environment they face. However, what started as an attempt for finding an economic explanation for
Chinese entrepreneurship in comparison the European cases of socialist transformation ended with a
new research agenda. For empirical and theoretical reasons it can no longer be assumed that there is
only one form of entrepreneurship in China. Instead, different forms of entrepreneurship leading to
different forms of firms can be expected. Another rather striking result of the research is that “culture
matters” in the sense that different forms of entrepreneurship and firms will emerge due to different
cultures within China. For this reason, a comparative study of entrepreneurship within China is needed
before one can claim there is only one specific form of Chinese firm or Chinese entrepreneurship. One
way to model such a frame for comparative studies will be presented below. After a short description of
the field study and a summary of the empirical results, Institutional Economics will be employed to  
identify those factors that shape the behaviour of all potential entrepreneurs. The paper finishes by
arguing that these factors do also explain the different forms of entrepreneurship and firms which can be
expected to emerge within China.3.
_______________________________________________________________________________
__
 Insert Table I about here
___________________________________________________________________________
                                                                
1 Richard R.  Nelson, The Sources of Economic Growth. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). Richard R.
Nelson,  “How New is New Growth Theory?”, Challenge  40, 5 (1997) pp.  29-58.
2 Paul Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle", Foreign Affairs (Nov./Dec.1994) pp. 62-78.
3 Part of the empirical research will appear in Barbara Krug and Laszlo Polos, „The Strawberry Growth Underneath the
Nettle: The Emergence of Entrepreneurship in China“ ,  Asian Pacific Journal of Management 2000 (forthcoming).
The economic model will be presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Society of New Institutional
Economics, Sept. 22-24. 2000, Tuebingen, Germany.
3THE FIELDWORK
The reason for choosing Shanxi is that the province represents the hinterland: At the beginning of the
reform half of Shanxi's counties had standards of living below the poverty line, and the water problem is
acute. Though more industrialised than other provinces in the same situation its industry was almost
completely controlled by coal mining. In 1995 Shanxi had a population of 30.77 million (2.5% of the
national population) and GDP p.c. was only 73% of the national average. Throughout the eighties and
till 1994 Shanxi’s rate of growth was consistently below the national average. The individual sector was
small, joint ventures rare, foreign trade added up (1995) to only 10% of provincial GDP (compared to the
national figure of over 40%). And yet, suddenly in 1995, 1996 and presumably in 1997 and 1998 also,
Shanxi’s growth rates outstripped China as a whole. Something must have happened. We know from
other studies that what had happened was that the provincial Party-state machinery got their act
together and facilitated growth either by state investment, property rights change, or industrial policy.
For example, Shanxi no longer exports coal but electricity, thus having created workplaces with a higher
added-value within its own boundaries. Another change is that the state assisted by establishing
companies which work in coal mine related business, thus promoting diversification. In a further move
the government facilitated private entrepreneurship. Unlike some coastal provinces, Shanxi could not
rely on foreign direct investment or on overseas communities whose background could be located
within the province. In short Shanxi had to rely on "endogenous growth" strategies: Both resources and
business strategies had to be built up without the help of foreigners or Overseas Chinese.
The empirical data used in the following consists of two sets: Data set 1 is based on all interviews, open
and standardised 1993, 1996, 1997, and 1999 in Shanxi.  One hundred and four business units were
identified as firms according to the following definition: (Non-State) firms are those business units
which are (1) exposed to competition in at least one factor or product market, and (2) can claim at least
part of residual profit. When profit went to one person or one family, the firm was regarded as a private
firm. When profit was divided among individuals and/or institutional owners, the firm was regarded as a
partnership or corporation. When profit was divided according to a sharecropping contract, between
individual, the manager, the village, and the village leadership, the model would be a common, i.e. a
jointly owned resource5. When profit was divided according to registered capital, or in other words, paid
dividends, the firm was regarded as a "shareholding" company following the expression Gufen-
                                                                
5 The model for jointly owned resources is found in Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1990).
4company. Likewise, those persons who crucially contributed to the building up and/or running of a firm
were regarded as entrepreneurs, irrespective of whether they were Party cadres or state officials.
In contrast, data set 2 making use of the knowledge and information gained in the years before is based
on a standard questionnaire filled out by 27 entrepreneurs in 1999. The difference between the two data
sets is that the first focused on the business environment while the second focused on private
exchange, the emergence of long-term business relations, the ways how to enforce business relations,
and the ways how to learn new business practices.
PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN SHANXI PROVINCE
The overall picture, which emerges from the formal interviews and the informal talks reveals that it was
neither "The” market" nor central political decisions which unleashed private entrepreneurship. On the
contrary, as will be discussed later the co-existence of both made private entrepreneurship in China an
as risky, uncertain venture as in other economies in transition. The interviews reveal, rather, that private
entrepreneurship was self-organised in villages rather than in urban agglomerations, and in co-operation
with local cadres and state agencies rather than by waiting for or complying with national legislation6.
Most strikingly the lack of resources, such as electricity, transport lines, supplies etc., was dismissed as
a factor in the establishment of a firm. Thus, 24 of the 27 respondents found the availability of roads and
railways, and - surprisingly - communication (Internet, fax, telephone) adequate. 19 (in the case of
energy) and 20 (in the case of land) were satisfied with energy and land, however stressing their
individual access to the small real estate market, and the need to improve the water situation in the
province. 15 out of 27 found the availability of local supply sufficient, and 8 more stressed that they did
not have to worry as they had long term contracts with big (foreign) firms and SOEs which ensured
enough input7. Instead, lack of organisation and institutions was mentioned: for example, the lack of
managerial skill, as well as the unavailability of financial services, which only 12 (in the case of
managerial skill) and 15 (in the case of support from banks) found adequate. Looking at all the
interviews, one cannot but see that the success in Shanxi relied on three devices, elaborated on
presently:
                                                                
6 In so far the analysis suggests a refutation of the model of corporatism in China. Yet, as will become clear in what
follows corporatism in an economic analysis is the outcome of individual and collective action in the political market.
Depending on the rules of the game in the political market more state corporatism or mores societal corporatism can
be expected. The point made in this paper is that the weak institutions in China do not allow us to predict which kind of
corporatism, if any, dominates. Different kinds of corporatism can emerge and co-exist in different localities. Likewise,
the forms can change over time. For the discussion of corporatism see Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, “China,
Corporatism, and the East Asian Model” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 33 (1995), pp. 29-53: Victor Nee,
“Organisational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property Rights, and Mixed Economy in China”,
Administrative Science Quarterly 37 (1992), pp. 1-27, and his somewhat different view in Victor Nee, The Role of the
State in making a Market Economy”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 156 (2000), pp. 64-88.
51. Reviving old economic institutions
2. Hijacking social organizations
3. Building up new business practices.
On one side this outcome looks trivial: To employ old, new and elements transferred from another area
comprehensively delineate the pools of possible devices for any change. Yet, on the other side, it can
also be argued that these findings are nothing but ad hoc solutions, representing a "chance" element or
a Shanxi-specific solution. The last argument cannot be taken up till the fieldwork is taken to another
province. However, the Shanxi data sets can help to investigate whether these three devices implicate
that tradition is behind the re-building of China's economic institution, or whether there is another
(economic) rationale that is employed by economic actors.
As Institutional Economics points out the establishment of long term business relations is the single
most crucial element in entrepreneurship. Firms, almost by definition, are the nexus of long term
contracts. Likewise, in order to survive firms need to establish predictable and reliable relations with
other firms, business partners in the factor, product and capital market, if not with the different layers of
government. It is from this perspective that the three devices, revival of old institutions, hijacking social
organisations, and the creation of new business practices, need to be assessed. The following will
present two illustrative examples for each case by no means claiming that there are not more.
 REVIVING OLD INSTITUTIONS
The advantage of using past economic institutions is that their economic use and value is known or
remembered8. Two of such institutions were found in Shanxi, sharecropping and the use of contracts.
The Use of Contracts
Although the Chinese law tradition concentrated mostly on what would be called today administrative
law and punitive law, commercial contracts were by no means unknown9. Nevertheless it came as a
surprise that 18 out of the 27 respondents interviewed in 1999 used contracts in their business
dealings10. The contracts were more than written letters of intent. Thus, for example, the contracts
specified length of business arrangement, price, quantity, product specification, quality, exceptional
                                                                                                                                                                                         
7 Those companies usually processing output of SOEs are often a management buy-out within the conglomerate of state
firms. They may face an unpleasant surprise when the SOE is forced to look for profitable ways of production as the
ongoing reforms intend.
8  For a general analysis see. Robert H. Frank, Passion within Reason: the Strategic Role of Emotions (New York:
Norton, 1988).
9 Chen, P., Chinese Legal Tradition under the Mongols (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 3-40.
Huang, R. 1587. A Year of No Significance. The Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1981); Lucie Cheng  and Arthur Rosett, "Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially Embedded Factors in the
Transformation from Hierarchy to Markets, 1978-1989", Journal of Chinese Law  5(2) (1991) pp. 143-244.
10 This finding is however supported by a study on Chinese legal culture executed in Shanghai. In the latter case, for
example, "ninety one per cent of the respondents agreed to the statement that an agreement to purchase an automobile
6circumstances under which force majeure would apply, and the procedure to be adopted in the event of
a dispute or non-compliance to the contract11. Items not always specified in the otherwise
comprehensive agreements were the “right to inspect the production site of the business partner” (in 5
cases), and procedural provisions in case something were to go wrong (in 4 cases). Only in 2 cases did
respondents insist on the tradition of oral agreements.
When asked how the contracts were enforced the following picture emerged: out of the 22 respondents
only three would automatically take recourse to the law, while 19 would start with bilateral negotiations,
sometimes relying on a friend or external arbitrator (14 cases). If this procedure should fail 6 would finish
the business relationship, while 7 would go to court. When asked informally what the courts are good
for if they are not used, the following explanation was given by two Chinese colleagues: A court might
be needed to identify the harming party and its "wealth position" but would be a "too expensive" way
to negotiate compensation.
Unfortunately, it was only after these answers pointed to a more general pattern of behaviour that the
obvious question was asked, namely what use contracting offers if not litigation. Despite the fact that
the answers were not included in the questionnaires, they give a clear picture: Contracts are used
predominantly in order to avoid ambiguity. As one respondent put it, not knowing much about the
business, and not knowing much about business practices in other parts of China or other sectors to
write down the precise terms of a business relation is seen as a useful device to avoid "trouble"
(respondent 014).
A comparison with the former (imperial) legal tradition shows to which extent an old institutions such as
contracts got aptly modified to fit today's purpose. The change is rather drastic: While in the past
private contracting outside the tenancy system and foreign trade was met with suspicion as it seemed to
indicate that both partners did not know the "appropriate way" to deal with each other13, if it were not
seen as an indicator for personal character deficiencies, today's contracting acknowledges and insists
on the ambiguity in relations, might these be based on different local cultures or the uncertainty a new
business environment creates. It could be argued that the institution that got revived is the contract
system that existed before Ming-dynasty  since the Ming-reforms aimed at weakening the private
                                                                                                                                                                                         
would be more effective if it were in writing", in Pitman B.Potter,  “Socialist Legality and Legal Culture in Shanghai: A
Survey of Geti”, Canadian Journal of Law and Society 9,2 (1994) pp. 41-72.
11 The respondents were asked whether there was a written, verbal or no agreement on the following items: price per
unit, other price formula, date at which payment to be made, length of business arrangement, precise quantity of goods
to be supplied over fixed period, minimum quantity to be supplied over fixed period, length of interval between order
and delivery, specification of the product, right to change specification, compensation for changes in specification,
quality of goods to be supplied, rights to inspect the other's production site/process, promise to do one's best,
exceptional circumstances under which force majeure will apply, circumstances under which negotiation can take place,
procedure to be adopted in the event that one sides fails to fulfil  the agreement, procedure to be adopted in the event
of a dispute.
13 For the history of China's legal tradition see literature in footnote 9.
7dispute settlement notion by their insistence to enforce moral law. Yet, this does not change the overall
picture, namely that one old institution was selected and revived.
That contracts are powerful devices to enhance predictability and accountability is not hard to see.
Economists would argue that they are powerful transaction cost saving devices as they allow effective
monitoring and enforcement of the performance of both contractual partners14. The Shanxi
entrepreneurs, as seen above, do not use contracting for this purpose. When asked why they use
contracts without using the accompanying enforcement agencies like in the West, the respondents said
that they knew better devices for enforcing agreements. One, most commonly used, way is that they
would enter a contract only with somebody they would trust. In other words, trust and contracting are
not seen as substitutes, let alone mutually exclusive. Instead they re-enforce each other: Without trust
no contract, and without ambiguity-reducing contract no trust15.
Sharecropping
Sharecropping was known in China for more than one thousand years. It is a lease contract where the
owner of a resource expects a certain fixed sum and a share on net return. The higher the share the
resource owner asks the higher the risk he personally takes, but simultaneously the higher his share on
the innovation rent. If, for example the resource owner asks for thirty per cent of net return, this means
s/he bears only thirty per cent of total loss/profit. Yet, her/his share of any productivity increasing
measure is also only thirty per cent. If, on the other hand, s/he asks for sixty per cent, s/he accepts the
major share in case of a loss/profit while expecting to profit most from innovation and productivity
increases16.
A look at data set 1 reveals that most of the companies visited started with assets transferred from either
State-owned companies or the village leadership (70 out of 104). In 44 cases sharecropping contracts
were used to transfer resources to the managerial control of the lessor. It is worth noticing that some of
these managers were able to buy these assets after a couple of years, and by doing so turned a state
firm into a private enterprise (12 cases). That managers quickly could accumulate enough capital for
such a Management-buy-out might be explained by the agreed upon sharing parameter in the original
contract. As data set 2 shows, the majority of the sharecropping arrangements left at least fifty percent
in the hands of the manager. Apparently, pessimistic cadres shied away from taking on more than half of
                                                                
14 For example in Richard Cooter, and Thomas Ulen,  Law and Economics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.
161-2; Barbara Krug,  “Comment to Qian Yingyi”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 156,1 (March
2000a) pp. 175-        179
15 Stephen Macauly,.“Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study”, American Sociological Review 28
(1963) pp. 55-67.
 16 Stephen Cheung, "Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements". Journal of Law
and Economics 12 (1969) pp. 23-42;  Stephen Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1969b); Joseph E. Stiglitz, “ Incentives and risk sharing in sharecropping”, Review of Economic Studies
(April. 1974) pp. 219-255. Barbara Krug, “Privatisation in China: Something to learn from?”,  in Herbert Giersch (ed).
Privatisation at the Turn of  the Century. (Berlin: Springer, 1997b), pp. 269-296.
8the loss in case of a business failure, not trusting that the manager would come up with organisational
changes and innovation which would turn the firm into a profitable venture. Subsequently, whenever
innovation occurred the manager then could claim the greater share. S/he became rich, or, at least rich
enough to buy out assets step by step.
To conclude from the widespread use of sharecropping that China's tradition offered a blueprint for
privatisation and economic success is however short-sighted. Sharecropping arrangements were not
copied but adapted to fit present conditions. While such arrangements were in the past used in land
deals only and constituted the specific Chinese form of share tenancy18, today such an arrangement is
used for leasing out industrial assets and land for industrial sites. Moreover, the lessor is no longer a
private person (landowner) but a collective agent, such as the village or State-owned enterprise. As the
literature shows sharecropping arrangements are efficient devices for risk sharing and the sharing of the
innovation rent. Moreover they help to establish predictability in particular with respect to what is
expected from the lessor, how profit is shared, and how individual investment and innovation gets
remunerated. They help to streamline behaviour as well as stabilise expectations. Finally, they provide
an effective way for re-allocating resources to private actors in a situation where private property rights
were unknown. Unlike what was attempted in some European socialist economies where privatisation
asked for enough private savings to buy assets, China found a way that allowed entrepreneurs with
ideas but not enough capital to gain control over assets to start a business19.
HIJACKING SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS FOR FOSTERING BUSINESS RELATIONS
It seems to be common knowledge that both the family and the village were the cause of China's rapidly
developing private sector. The field study in Shanxi suggests a modified view, namely that both
institutions were hijacked for entrepreneurial purposes. As economists would argue, the advantage of
such a practice is that these institutions allow the employment of social routines in behaviour and social
sanctioning mechanisms for economic transactions in an environment of ill-functioning markets and ill-
functioning law20. Another result is that the Shanxi-data warns against taking the notion of the family or
the village too literally. As will be seen presently, the family plays no role when it comes to starting a
business.
                                                                
18 An economic analysis of sharecropping is found in the literature in footnote 16.
19 See Barbara Krug “Moving the Mountains: Transformation as Institution Building from Below”, in Juergen Backhaus
and Guenther Krause (eds) The Political Economy of Transformation: Country Studies  (Marburg: Metropolis, 1997a),
pp. 127-152; and  Barbara Krug,  Privatisation in China, 1997.
20The "classics" are James S.  Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press,
1990), and Avner Greif,  “Reputation and Coalition in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghrabi Trades”, Journal of
Economic History 69, 4 (1989) pp. 857-883.
9The family
That the family is at the core of Chinese entrepreneurship seems to be common knowledge. The
business administration literature claims so21, the dominance of family controlled Chinese multinationals
in Hong Kong seems to confirm this, and economic theory points into this direction too: the family
functions as a capital pooling institution, where information is freely shared and where proximity keeps
opportunistic behaviour at bay. Sinologists, anthropologists and sociologists doing research on the
notion of the family22 were not so sure. For example, they stressed the fact that  "lineage", i.e. extended
families (in Chinese: zu), is concentrated mainly and predominantly in southern China23. The empirical
evidence in Shanxi, i.e. a province in the North of China, shows that the notion of an extended family
does not exist.  The Shanxi-data sets show that the family did not play any role when it came to
establishing a firm, i.e. as a capital and skill pooling institution. A general answer to the question why
the family as an institution is not more often employed in Shanxi was that "if one person was poor, most
probably his family is poor too".  As economists would claim, this interpretation misses the advantage
of the "extended family", namely that the greater size of the extended family allows relative poor family
members to engage in entrepreneurship since they can mobilise capital and skill from a larger pool24.
Another general reason heard in Shanxi is that a poor family does not want to "put all the eggs in one
basket". Instead the family would insist on risk-diversification, expecting different family members to try
out different business ventures. In this case economists would also agree, since it is known that the
family functions as a risk-mitigating institution25. Thus, it is interesting to know whether the Shanxi-
family is a resource pooling or a risk-mitigating institution - or both26. This distinction could provide a
useful starting point for a comparative study of entrepreneurship within China. It would be interesting
to learn whether the extended family serving as a resource pooling institution exists, and in which part
of China.
The answers to three questions in data set 1 can illustrate the fact of the “missing family”:
(1) Only 20 out of the 104 (data set 1) visited entrepreneurs were a private business in the sense
that all assets were in private hands. Yet, only in 3 cases did the family provide the start-up capital in
                                                                
21 Gordon S. Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism. (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1990); Gordon S.
Redding. “The Distinct Nature of Chinese Capitalism”, The Pacific Review 9. 3 (1996). Richard Whitley, “Eastern
Asian Enterprise Structure and the Comparative Analysis of Forms of Business Organization”’ in P.N. Ghauri and S.B.
Prasad (eds.) International Management (London: Dryden Press, 1995), pp. 191-212.
22 M.H. Fried, The Fabric of Chinese Society. A Study of Social Life of a Chinese County Seat (New York: Praeger,
1953) pp. 27-88; Maurice Freedman, Family and Kinship in Chinese Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press1970); Kiong, T.C. “Centripetal Authority, Differentiated Networks: The Social Organization of Chinese Firms in
Singapore”, in Gary Hamilton (ed) Business Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia  (Hong
Kong: Centre of Asian Studies Occasional papers and Monographs, No. 99,1991) pp. 176-200.
23 For example Lloyd E. Eastman, Family, Fields, and Ancestor. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.19.
24 Francis Fukuyama, Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Penguin, 1995); Gordon S.
Redding, “The Distinct Nature of Chinese Capitalism”,  The Pacific Review 9,3 (1996).
25 Rosenzweig, “Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low Income Countries”, The Economic
Journal 98 (1998) pp. 1148-1170; Rosenzweig, M.R. and Stark, O. “Consumption Smoothing, Migration and Marriage:
Evidence from Rural India”, Journal of Political Economy  97 (1989) pp. 905-926.
26 This distinction could provide a useful starting point for a comparative study of entrepreneurship within China. It
would be interesting to learn whether the extended family serving as a resource pooling institution exists, and in which
part of China.
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form of a repayable loan. This is in sharp contrast to "friends" who, mentioned 34 times, offered money
if they did not form a (temporary) partnership with entrepreneur for a specific business venture, which
was dissolved the moment the initiator could afford to buy out the partners.
(2) The family was mentioned only twice (in data set 2) as being consulted when financial losses
asked for bankruptcy procedures 27. This confirms that even if somebody claims a firm to be a family
business, in most cases, such a firm knows one owner only.
(3)  The family was mentioned only once (in data set 2) when asked to whom the respondent
would turn to in case of an emergency, in the form of illiquidity or insolvency. This is in striking contrast
to friends (mentioned nine times), commercial partners (mentioned 5 times), state agencies (mentioned 5
times) and capital owners (mentioned twice). The fact that banks were mentioned 19 times does not
necessarily indicate a "crowding out" of traditional ways of doing things. Here, sequencing matters: a
firm would first turn to a bank, and if this should fail, then they would turn to friends and business
partners who are regarded as the creditor of last resort. The entrepreneur would, however, not turn to
the family.
As seen from the answers, "friends" are important. Further inquiries revealed that three social groups
formed the focus for friendship in the business environment of Shanxi-entrepreneurs: childhood friends,
friends with whom one passed the military service together and classmates from institutions of higher
education. The People's Liberation Army and "alumni-clubs with Chinese characteristics" deserve some
attention. They certainly represent another example of how aptly the Chinese entrepreneurs modified
inherited social custom to present day's use. While the family is concentrated in one (geographical)
area, both the PLA and the universities are institutions where people from all over China meet. To the
extent that comrades in the army and classmates go back to their native county after graduation,
friendship allows for establishing business relations across "China" (and by doing so contribute to the
establishment of an integrated national market).
In short, networks, which offer access to the national market are seen as of higher economic value than
the locally concentrated family. The Shanxi entrepreneurs did not see a problem with respect to loyalty,
norms of reciprocity, and emotionally based caring for each other when it came to friends. Trust,
reliability, and accountability are expected to be dominant features in these networks, which
subsequently should be interpreted as close substitutes for families. There might be less affection,
which in a family would limit opportunistic behaviour, but on the other hand, friends are less inhibited
when it comes to sanctioning misdemeanour28. Somebody who shirks obligations or plays foul is known
quickly to all other members and, in the extreme, will be excluded from future information sharing or
business deals. As was shown above, one way to enforce a contract was not to renew it but switch to
another partner.  By doing so, one business partner signals his mistrust to the other members of the
network. In this sense a social institution, such as a network of friends, serves admirably well to the
purpose of establishing predictable and accountable behaviour, as well as establishing certain business
practices shared by many.
                                                                
27 Which in the Chinese context means merely to dissolve the firm. It is worth mentioning that in twelve cases (out of
27) the respondents did not know any answer to the question of bankruptcy, indicating that they cannot go bankrupt.
28 T. Yamagishi, and N. Takahashi,  “Evolution of Norms without Metanorms”,  in Ulrich.Schulz, W
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Does this mean that the family is completely discarded as an institution in the business sector in
Shanxi? The following example (Graph 2) indicates a modified answer, namely that the family is not (or
no longer) used as a resource-pooling institution. Instead the family offers a pool of reliable managers
for supervising different branches of a well-established branch of the business.
______________________________________________________________________________
Insert Graph 2 about here
___________________________________________________________________________
In 1989 Mr. Wang29 used RMB 5.000 he had saved from trading cloths (an occupation he had taken up
in 1986) to open a workshop for household appliances. It was a friend who had suggested this business.
In the workshop Mr. Wang repaired and sold electric fans, air conditionings and lamps. By doing so he
acquired some experience in electronics which made him confident enough to start negotiation with
Robert Bosch Car Electronics a firm to which he was introduced in 1991. In the end he got a contract as
one of the official Bosch Car Electronic garages. It quickly turned out that he did not have a workforce
skilled enough to fulfil the contract. He turned to a friend from his time in the army for help, who in turn
managed to hire some railway engineers from a PLA engineering brigade. These technicians were crucial
for the success of the garage, which turned into such a profitable business that in the course of four
years (1992-1996) Mr. Wang further invested in an International Club, i.e. a posh restaurant, built up the
largest catering firm in North China, opened more recreational facilities, let's say clubs, and started two
construction companies in Australia. The different branches of his business in China are managed by
his son and son-in-law, while one daughter is in charge of the Australian companies.
Aside from the "familial" governance structure, what is remarkable in this firm is that instead of
expanding the profitable core business, i.e. car electronics, Mr. Wang invested in other sectors and
other countries.  It is not hard to see the advantage of investing in different sectors and countries as
long as the "confiscation risk" in China remains high. The speed by which Mr. Wang diversified his
business, let alone what made him change the line of business asks for an explanation. In all cases
friends were decisive. This turns part of the common sense knowledge about the role of the family and
the role of networks around. While (in the West) the family is seen as a resource pooling institution
while networks help to monitor and enforce business relations, Mr. Wang did the opposite. He used the
network as a resource, in particular knowledge and information pooling institutions, while the family
provided the service for monitoring business relations. This feature was also found in the companies of
other  Shanxi entrepreneurs (for example respondent 019). In how far that is a coincidence or a
systematic factor within Shanxi or China needs to be analysed further. It is however worth emphasising
that Hong Kong conglomerates do also employ family members for supervising different branches of
the business.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
.Albers, U. Mueller (eds) Social Dilemmas and Cooperation (Berlin: Springer, 1994) pp. 311-326.
29 Mr. Wang is a fictitious name referring to respondent No. 014.
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The Village
Ever since Ming-dynasty villages and rural communities became the natural owner of natural resources
(except land), the agency of last resort for civil and moral law, the basic unit of defence, and the primary
collective actor in the political and social arena. Despite some attempts by Chairman Mao, this did not
change much during the Mao Zedong-era. The constitution of 1982 reconfirmed  this role however with
major changes. Thus, for example the village became responsible for tax revenues and for generating
work places30. So far, it could be argued the village went "back" to the institutional design of the pre-
socialist era, were it not that the village provides another example for the remarkable adaptation.
Certainly one of the most exciting features of institution building in China is that starting in the middle
of the eighties, and unnoticed, let alone approved, by the central government, villages began to design
so-called village compacts. These village constitutions established an electoral system that might not fit
Western notions of democracy but which is a big step forward to the establishment of accountable
government31. An analysis of these constitutions shows that the protection of assets, contracts and
transactions, dominates each constitution32.  At the same time so-called ethic committees were
established which come close to law enforcement agencies and "courts", with a jury system not unlike
the Anglo-Saxon tradition to which members are elected by the village community. It took the national
government in Beijing something like five to seven years to notice that some remarkable institution-
building from below had occurred. An intrinsic motivation to build up democratic institutions was not
behind this development as the open interviews in data set 1 reveal33. Instead elections and local law
enforcement agencies were seen as instrumental for the establishment of predictable and accountable
state agencies.
The village's crucial role not only with respect to the establishment of firms, but also to the development
of property rights can be seen in the following example (respondent 019): An aluminium processing
plant started as a dilapidated Township and Village enterprise (TVE) employing not more than thirty
people (Graph 1).
______________________________________________________________________________
Insert Graph 1 about here
                                                                
30 Barbara Krug, “Privatisation In China “,1997;  Qian “the Process of China’s Market Transition”2000
31 Barbara Krug “Moving the Mountain” 1997; Li Lianjiang. 1999. “The Two-Ballot System in Shanxi Province:
Subjecting Village Party Secretaries to a Popular Vote”, The China Journal  42 (1999) pp. 103-118.
32 In 1998 sixty per cent of the villages had already held their second round of elections. The notable exception to the
economic tasks of the village is the One-Child policy.
33 See also Victor Nee, and R. Matthews, “Market Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State
Socialism”, Annual Review of  Sociology. 22 (1996) pp. 401-435; Louis Putterman, “The Role of Ownership and
Property Rights in China's Economic Transition”, The China Quarterly 144 (1995) pp. 1049-1064; Jean C.  Oi, “The
Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy”, The China Quarterly 144 (1995) pp. 1132-1149.Barbara
Krug  “Privatisation in China”1997; Lianjiang Li, “Two Ballot System” 1999; for a general analysis of villages in
Shanxi see David S.G. Goodman,  „Collectives and Connectives, Capitalism and Corporatism: Structural Change in
China“.,The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 11 (1995) pp. 12-32.
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__________________________________________________________________________
In order to turn the workshop around and to generate workplaces (and revenues) the village needed
· somebody with a good idea
· a complementary infrastructure, such as roads, water, electricity
· investment
· a mixture of regulation and taxation that facilitates private entrepreneurship.
In the first stage, the village established a construction company whose demand for unskilled labour
allowed the securement of  workplaces for excess labour in agriculture. At the same time friends of
individual village leaders explored further opportunities. One (SOE) which had spun-off a construction
company expressed interest in village land on the condition that it would be first converted into an
industrial site. The village was expected to invest in roads and to ensure connection to the main power
lines and water. Subsequently, negotiations with the electricity company of the province started in
which the electricity provider promised the necessary investment and a steady supply in return for a
share on net return. So far, the village had converted land into an attractive industrial site for
manufacturing in which both the SOE and the province would invest. At this stage how to use the
industrial site, let alone what to produce, was not yet decided upon. Later a private entrepreneur was
introduced who had a connection with the largest aluminium factory in Asia, but neither the financial
capital nor the land necessary for building a factory himself. He promised to broker a long-term supplier
contract with the aluminium factory and further financial capital, again in return for a share on net
returns. Finally, the village "economic negotiation committee" put all these different stakes together,
organised trips to other provinces in order to hire the necessary skilled (and unskilled) workforce, and
"designed" a set of licences, regulation, and taxation which promised that not only the start-up costs
but also the running costs would remain low. In return for these services, this negotiation committee
also asked for a part of the returns. In the end the ownership and governance looks as follows (graph 1):
The providers of electricity and scarce financial capital own 67% of the shares, the village as provider of
land and partly of workers gets 6% plus 27% for its economic negotiation committee. Three features in
this elaborate ownership and governance structure deserve attention34:
The village facing claims on net returns prefers an official registration of the claimants as "owners". By
doing so, risk is shared, limiting ex post opportunism by one of the parties, while the claims on profit are
linked to the initial registered capital. Subsequently, the claims become predictable, allowing better
calculation and safer accumulation of capital in the firm. By converting claims on returns into registered
capital the village and the other participants establish property rights on physical, financial and social
capital, something national policy still shies away from. The formation of property rights in this case
acknowledges the value of the village economic committee; more precisely the social capital such an
institution can provide.
                                                                
34 Other forms of property right formation can be found in X.L.Ding, "The Illicit Asset Stripping of Chinese State
Firms", The China Journal, Vol. 43 (January 2000) pp. 1-28.
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The role the village in China played in the transformation process deserves more attention in the
literature on transition economies: The Chinese example shows that a more decentralised approach
which opens ways to experiment with different forms of institutions has its merits. It allows economic
actors to innovate, to adapt and to choose organisations or institutions according to specific
conditions. The way property rights were introduced first with respect to land and later with respect to
industrial assets as shown above provide an excellent example for organisational and/or institutional
innovation35.
BUILDING UP NEW BUSINESS PRACTICES
So far the analysis suggests that entrepreneurship is the result of organisational change and the re-
building of institutions rather than technical innovation or the "marketisation" of the economy. On the
individual level this means that Shanxi entrepreneurs respond to signals from friends and networks, the
way (Western) entrepreneurs respond to market signals. As the matter of fact, they do both: Data set 2
shows that although 10 respondents (out of 27) found price, and 14 respondents (out of 27) quality,
"very important" , in "choosing to enter a business relation with X, 10 (out of 27) found "the
respectability and influence of X within the local community" and 12 (out of 27) "the reputation of X for
reliability" very important. If this result is representative then the way resources are allocated within
networks, and how networks emerge and survive, becomes as crucial for economic development as the
emergence and stability of markets.
Before the functions of networks in China will be analysed further, some general remarks on individual
business behaviour can help to explain why a network is more than a label for a group which shares
socio-demographic attributes, such blood relations, or place of origin36.
The emergence of routines
A large part of business relations is based on so-called routines (or custom) which everybody knows to
be “the right way of doing things”. They represent the view of how things are done, which is shared by
many and leads to behavioural patterns such as, for example, regarding written contracts as the normal
way to establish business relations for all partners. For this reason routines remain outside any
“rational” decision making. These routines can be effective tools for keeping transaction costs down in
private business deals. In order to function such routines need to be recognisable, unambiguous and
                                                                
35 For land rights see Scott Rozelle, and Guo Li, “Village Leaders and Land-Rights Formation in China”,  Amercian
Economic Review (papers and proceedings) 88,2 (1998) pp. 433-438: Louis Putterman, “The Role of Ownership”,
1995; Jonathan Unger,  and Anita Chan, “Inheritors of the boom: Private Enterprise and the Role of Local
Government in a Rural South China Township”,  The China Journal 42 (1999) pp. 45-74.
36The following is based on the analysis in Ekkehard Schlicht, “On Custom”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics, 149 (1993) pp. 178-203; Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior ( New York-London:
W.W.Norton, 1978); Robert Frank, Passion Within Reason (New York: Norton , 1988; Barbara Krug, “On Custom in
Economics” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 155 (1999) pp. 405-428; Laszlo  Pólos,  Michael T.
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enforceable. Subsequently, economic actors will congregate around commonly shared business
practices. Each actor will choose a business partner from this pool of people who acknowledge the same
or similar business routines. The advantage of doing so is that each member does not have to scrutinise
and check whether, for example, the employment of contracts is advantageous or not, and whether the
other side is (mis-)interpreting the use of contracts as a sign of mistrust. Economic actors assume that
those from the same place of origin or those speaking the same dialect will know the same routines  -
and therefore start doing business with each other. For this reason it can be assumed that a Shanxi
entrepreneur will prefer to do business with somebody from the same locality, rather than
indiscriminately start business relations with anybody who offers favourable terms , as neo-classical
economics would assume. Yet, when it comes to outsiders and “strangers”, a way needs to be found
that allows the screening of newcomers in order to make sure that they abide by the same routines. It is
the network, which provides the necessary monitoring and enforcement, while reputation refers to the
fact that a member knows the routines and abides to them. In short, the network shapes and controls the
individual behaviour of potential business partners, and in particular monitors whether these can be
trusted to play by the same rules.
The emergence of networks
Aside from generating a pool of business partners who share the same custom, the Shanxi-data sets
confirm the assumptions about networks as discussed in the literature when they
· offer access to resources
· broker business deals
· share information and knowledge. Most importantly, they
· supply any entrepreneur with reliable partners for re-establishing business practices and
institutions.
The open interviews from data set 1 revealed that the underlying assumption in Shanxi is that if one
"interactively" agrees on certain practices with friends, i.e. people who are trustworthy and reliable, then
these practices and institutions must be ones that facilitate "honest trading" while rewarding individual
performance37.
The Shanxi data suggest two other aspects of networks rarely found in the literature: First, there is no
fixed number of networks, defined by family, place of origin, shared educational experience, etc.38
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Hannan, and Glenn R. Carroll,   “Forms and Populations”, in Glenn R.Carroll and Michael. T. Hannan (eds.)The
demography of Corporations and Industries . (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) pp. 59-81.
37 The argument was also used for the contrary case, namely that if one deals with doubtful characters, or "Party
crooks", then the ensuing institutions must be ones that neither reward personal performance (and effort) nor
"fairness".
 38It is worth mentioning that all empirical studies in social psychology on Chinese attitudes toward the family and
networks support the Shanxi study: Common interest in China creates stable relations and networks. Trust, loyalty or
reliability do not need a family, or kin at the core. See for example, David Yau-Fai Ho and Chi-Yue, “ Component Ideas
of Individualism, Collectivism, and Social Organization” in U. Kim et.al.Individualism and Collectivism  (London: Sage,
1994), pp. 137-156;  Wong Siu-lun, "Chinese Entrepreneurs and Business Trust", in Gary Hamilton (ed.), Business
Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia  (Hongkong: Univerity of Hongkong, 1991), pp.13-
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Instead each individual entrepreneur will use different networks for different purposes. As said before,
the PLA dominates the market for skilled labour, while former classmates function as middle-men to take
the business to another province or into another sector, and a comrade helps to get access to export
licences. In other words, while what all networks have in common is that they offer a pool of reliable
business partners and information, different networks offer different services. Second, in order to fully
employ networks an entrepreneur does not need to be a member of each of them. The introduction of a
friend is enough39. It is the diversification of output the different networks offer plus the manageable
entry and exit costs, which allow individual entrepreneurs to fully exploit each network's comparative
advantage40. This also explains why a great deal of Shanxi networks of entrepreneurs do not employ
patron-client relations, let alone the Mafia-kind of relations, both of which are based on local
monopolies and mutual dependency.
To employ a multi-layered system of networks instead of relying on bilateral personal relations offers
other advantages. The pool of resources, reliable business partners, knowledge, and information is
larger, while scale economies can be expected when a larger group of business partners subscribes to
the same business practice. Monitoring costs are lower to the extent that not each contract needs to be
monitored. Instead, reputation and the sanctioning mechanisms of networks serve as enforcement
devices.
All in all, as it was with the case of choosing the right institution, the selection of individual business
partners and networks does also reflect neither random choice nor blind imitation. Once again past
performance is taken as a predictor of future behaviour, which as Institutional Economics has shown is
useful in situations of high uncertainty41. Evolutionary economics claims that such devices need to
promise an economic value, otherwise they would not be selected. This  can, but must not, mean that
rational actors carefully weighting the (expected) returns and costs “choose” them. As a matter of fact,
the emergence of business routines cannot be rationally chosen as they reflect tacit knowledge whose
usefulness is left unscrutinised. The analysis of routines, therefore, depends on a thorough knowledge
about Chinese business practices and the employment of cognitve sciences, such as social psychology
or sociology. Whether intended or not, the instrumentality of revived, transferred or newly established
institutions is decisive in the long run. The selection process at work will facilitate the imitation of those
devices which contribute to economic development (or welfare) while those institutions which cannot
contribute (or contribute less) will be dismissed (or forgotten). The instrumentality of institutions here
                                                                                                                                                                                         
47; Hwang Kwang-Kuo, "Modernization of the Chinese Family Business", in Henry S.R. Kao, Sinha Durganand, Ng Sek-
Hong (eds.), Effective Organisations and Social Values (London: Sage 1994), pp. 37-62. Hong Liu, "Old Linkages, New
Networks: The Globalization of Overseas Chinese Voluntary Associations and its Implications", The China Quarterly,
No. 155 (September 1998), pp. 582 - 610. Kwok Leung, "Negotiation and Reward Allocations Across Cultures", in P.C.
Early and M. Erez (eds.), New Perspectives on International Industrial/Organizational Psychology (San Francisco: New
Lexington Press, 1997), pp. 640-675.
39 Michael Harris Bond, Beyond the Chinese Face (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Peter M. Blaug,
"Interpersonal Choice and Networks in China", Social Forces Vol. 69, 4 (June 1991) pp. 1037-1062.  
40 See also Thomas Menkhoff, “Yinyong or How to Trust Trust: Chinese non-contractual business relations and social
structure”, Internationales Asienforum  23 (1992) pp. 262-288.
41 Barbara Krug, “On Custom in the Economy”, 1999; Robert Frank, Passion within Reason, 1988.
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refers to accountability and predictability  in business relations, and not to efficiency which would be
the selection criteria for choosing production factors. Those institutions, which promise more
predictable business relations or help to find “accountable” business partners (individuals or local
government) will be preferred.
So far the descriptive analysis of Shanxi entrepreneurship. It leaves one wondering whether and to
which extent the findings can be seen as representative for the whole of China. To deal with this
question in a systematic way asks for a theoretical framework that employs two sets of assumption
1. We may assume that Chinese entrepreneurs, i.e. individual agents, respond to the business
environment in a systematic way: Trying to make the best out of it causes them to move towards those
activities that promise positive returns (profit) while avoiding those which prove to be costly. They will
do so unilaterally or, if this should be too expansive or impossible, they will join forces with others. If a
common denominator for the business environment can be found then the common feature of Chinese
entrepreneurs can be traced. An example would be entrepreneurship itself. Once the reforms allowed
them to do so, a great number of Chinese started their own business. When they realised that the
needed capital exceeded their personal savings or knowledge they looked for others with whom they
could pool resources.
2. We may assume additionally that there is heterogeneity in China to the effect that Chinese
entrepreneurs face different sets of alternatives from which they select devices with which they expect
to help to overcome the problems as defined by the situational constraints  (see below) An example
would be that in the South of China the (extended) family is known or remembered as the natural pool of
resources, an alternative that Shanxi entrepreneurs do not see. Subsequently, family firms will emerge in
the South while Shanxi or other places will be dominated by firms in which collective actors (other firms
or state agencies) claim property rights42.
While the first assumption is straightforward and well supported by many field studies43, the second
assumption is intriguing.
THE SITUATIONAL CONSTRAINT
It certainly can be claimed that, indeed, the Chinese entrepreneurs have something in common, which
distinguishes them from entrepreneurs in Japan, Europe or Australia. The distinguishing feature is the
situation they find themselves in, namely the reform process, which aims at the transformation of the
economy. In an economic analysis  the situation works as constraint in the form of transaction costs.
                                                                
42 Alternatively it can also be argued that the observed behaviour is a result of lengthy evolution, whereby a powerful
selection mechanism wipes out such entrepreneurial activity that does not conform to contemporary situational
constraints. This assumption is analysed in Barbara Krug and Laszlo Polos, “The Strawberry growth underneath the
Nettle: The Emergence of  Entrepreneurs in China”, Erasmus University Management Report 2000 forthcoming.
43 See Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan  “Inheritors of the boom” 1999 and the field studies listed therein .
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Uncertainty
The Chinese economy 45can be best characterised by two features: Higher then normal level of
uncertainty and weak institutions. Uncertainty may come from the environment, but may also be
generated internally by technology. Environmental uncertainties reflect the (at least partly)
unpredictable behaviour of business partners, ignorance, opportunism, bankruptcy, and sudden major
re-organisations. Subsequently, demand seems serendipitous, supply is accidental. In these
circumstances an entrepreneur faces the following problems:
1. S/he faces a low general level of expertise in the society at large. There is nobody to imitate, no
procedure to copy, expertise cannot be easily learned with the help of formal or informal education,
and neither can expertise be bought. In short, it is the newness of the organisational form of the firm
that poses the challenge for entrepreneurs.
2. There is no collective memory about what can go wrong as there is no past experience on which to
rely upon
3. There is no general knowledge about (excess) demand, price- or income elasticity of demand, let
alone systematic research that would help an entrepreneur to calculate the risk of his venture.
4. There is no routine of business practice upon which an economic agent can rely. The effect of this
high level of uncertainty is then that each individual entrepreneur faces a high variety of responses
to each of his actions.
Notwithstanding the need to acquire (foreign) capital or other resources, to organise, manage and create
business practices - or institutions – is crucial46 in the situation of uncertainty. In the long run the value
of each resource, may that be land, Western machinery, the Internet, or a skilled workforce depends on
the ability to innovatively design the business relations with each business partner (and the
                                                                
45 Richard Whitley, “Eastern Asian Enterprise Structure and the Comparative Analysis of Forms of Business
Organisation”, in P.N. Ghauri and S.B. Prasad (eds.) International Management (London: Dryden Press, 1995) pp. 191-
212. Richard Whitley, J. Henderson, L. Czaban, G. and Lengyel,  “Trust and Contractual Relations in an Emerging
Capitalist Economy: The Changing Trading Relationships of Ten Large Hungarian Enterprises”,  Organisation Studies
17, (1996) pp. 397-420; Victor Nee, “The Role of the State in Making a Market Economy”, Journal of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics 156, 1 (2000) pp. 64-88. For a more general discussion see James  D.Thompson,
Organisations in Action.(McGraw-Hill  New York, 1967);  Bart  Nooteboom, H. Berger and N.G. Noorderhaven,
“Effects of Trust and Governance on Relational Risk”, Academy of Management Journal 40, 1 (1997) pp. 308-332;
Arthur L. Stinchcombe, “Social Structure of Organisations”, in  James G. March (ed.) Handbook of Organisations
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965) pp. 142-193.
46 Walter W. Powell,  “Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organisation”, Research in Organisational
Behaviour 12 (1990) pp. 295-336; Stephen Pratten, “The Nature of Transaction Cost Economics”, Journal of
Economic Issues 31,3 (1997) pp. 781-803; Eirik Furubotn and Rudolf Richter. Institutions and Economic Theory. The
Contribution of the New Institutional Economic. (Ann Arbor:: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Oliver Williamson,
“The Evolving Science of Organisation”, Journal of  Institutional and  Theoretical Economics 149 (1993) pp. 36-63.
For China see Louis Putterman, “The Role of Ownership and Property Rights” 1995; Jean C. Oi, “The Role of the
Local State in China's Transitional Economy”, 1995; Victor Nee and Sijin Su, “Institutional Change and Economic
Growth in China”, Journal of Asian Studies 40 (1990) pp. 3-25; Qian Yingyi and C. Xu, “Why China’s Economic
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government). Private property rights cum standard contracts are of limited help only since both rely on
the assumption that all future outcomes can be captured and transacted in present-day contracts. This
is already difficult in a world of well-established business practices, and more so in a world of high
uncertainty. In the long run the value of each resource depends on the ability to innovatively design the
business relations with each business partner (and the government).
Weak economic institutions
The usual way economies and societies deal with behavioural uncertainty, might this be caused by
natural or moral hazard, by external shocks, value changes, or innovation is to create institutions and/or
organisations for the purpose of "streamlining" behaviour. In (Western) market economies business
practices, for example, depend on contracts, private property rights, laws, the notion of liability and
compensation as well as the consensus that innovation should be rewarded. In short: "Institutional
environments that provide general purpose safeguards relieve the need for added transaction-specific
support. Accordingly, transactions that are viable in an institutional environment that provides strong
safeguards may be nonviable in institutional environments that are weak, because it is not cost-effective
for parties to craft transaction-specific governance in the latter circumstances47". Subsequently, the
weaker the institution, the greater the variety of possible responses and the higher the uncertainty with
respect to expected outcomes. As uncertainty translates into risk for which an appropriate premium
needs to be calculated, economic agents have a strong incentive to search for (institutional) solutions
which are more advantageous for at least some of them (with the loser being compensated). While
changing the overall frame of institutions might be outside the control of individual agents and rather
depend on the functioning of the political market, the governance of individual transactions (private
exchange) is not. It is worth mentioning that the problem of China and her entrepreneurs is not that
there are still socialist institutions working; it is rather that both the remains of the socialist past and the
newly introduced market mechanism are weak48.
Weakness in this case refers to the ability of institutions to shape behaviour. Modern organisation
theory49 shows that in order to function institutions must offer a "code" whose violation is connected
to a specific sanctioning mechanism that does not tolerate observed code violations. Institutions are
effective if the costs of code violations work as a deterrent. The less economic agents violate the code
and/or the less codes get violated the higher the level of regularity and predictability in the business
environment. In China, however, as in most emerging market economies, these codes, which might be
business practices, expectations or laws work as occasional “blueprints” only.  They are rarely
sanctioned effectively enough. Weak economic institutions, in other words, do not contribute much to
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Reforms Differ: The M-Form Hierarchy and Entry? Expansion of the Non-State Sector” Economics of Transition 1,2
(1993) pp. 135-170.
47  Oliver Williamson, “The Evolving Science of Organizations” 1993, p.476
48 Victor Nee “ The Role of the State, 2000; Yingyi  Qian, “The process of China’s Market Transition”, 2000).
49 Glenn R.Carroll and Michael T. Hannan, The Demography of Corporations and Industries.  (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000).
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the problem of reducing high uncertainty. On the contrary, if, as it is the case, such institutional
weaknesses lead to the (oligopolistic) competition between a few producers of institutions, such as the
Communist Party, local government or strong social network then the costs for "acquiring" a predictable
and accountable business environment can increase rapidly. In this case bribing oneself into a useful
business network is the cost one has to pay for securing a relatively more predictable business
environment50.
Both situational constraints, weak institutions and uncertainty, can help to explain why searching for
devices that shape individual behaviour offers high returns in China. In other words, to invest in
social capital, i.e. networks, trust, reputation or business practices, offers higher returns at the
beginning of entrepreneurship than to invest in capital goods around a core business. Moreover, under
uncertainty and weak political institutions, flexibility that allows the quick change of location,
production, and even the closing of firms can be paramount to success. This is so for basically two
reasons: one is the ability to circumvent the confiscation risk if a firm gets too big, too influential or in
the way of another well-protected firm. Another reason is that a successful entrepreneur needs to
quickly exploit market opportunities about which s/he might learn via the network. Thus, while a
company in the West which switches name, line of production, or location would be judged as
unreliable, and subsequently mistrusted, a Chinese firm can change its identity without much cost as
long as the entrepreneurs and the network behind the firm remain stable and reliable. In short, theory
would then expect that (successful) Chinese firms reveal a weak organisational identity supplemented
by entrepreneurs and networks with a reputation for reliability and predictability –  and this is indeed
what the empirical study in Shanxi showed.
Conclusion:The Spatial Dimension of Entrepreneurship
So far it was shown that entrepeneurship in China can be modelled by the assuming a specific
behavioural patter shared by all would-be entrepeneurs: High levels  of uncertainty and weak
institutions make it advantageous to invest in social capital and to establish firms with a weak
organizational identity in order to swiftly shift production to new business opportunities. The Shanxi
data set when compared to the results of empirical research elsewhere suggests, that indeed, this kind of
behaviour can be found across China.
                                                                
50 Diego Gambetta, D. The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Protection. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
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That leaves the question how to model the heterogeneity within China, which might cause different
forms of entrepeneurship and forms of firms. One way to do so is to start with the assumption that all
three/four factors, namely the situational constraint, the remembered economic and social institutions as
well as the behavioural patterns and the collective memory reveal a spatial dimension. In short , different
forms of firms will emerge in response to different situational constraint, different institutions
remembered, different collective memories and differences in the speed and scope by which business
practices can be established.  To find out the geographical boundaries of these factors asks then for
comparative studies where one or two of these factors are varied in a systematic way. One could, for
example assume that the level of uncertainty and weak institutions is higher in the hinterland than in the
coastal cities.  Subsequently, different forms of entrepreneurship might develop even within the group
of potential entrepeneurs, which remember the same set of institutional devices and share the same
collective memory. In this case the development of firms would be “situation driven”, implicitly
suggesting that once China will have developed an integrated domestic market, firms will converge to
one form. In contrast to this, other studies could start in a location where the situational constraint is
known to be the same focusing on differences in the institutional past. To the extent that remembered
economic institutions and hijacked social organizations offer the blueprint for entrepeneurship, a special
kind of path dependency could be confirmed. In this case different forms of firms can be expected,
irrespective that all firms face the same business environment. Finally, the collective memory and the
shaping of behavioural patterns orchestrated by networks will lead to different forms of entrepeneurship
even if both the situational constraint and the set of institutional devices were the same. In this case
internal migration might offer a useful starting point for an analysis. If, for example, a special Shanxi- or
Wenzhou way of doing things should survive within communities form these places in the coastal
cities, then forms of firms will emerge in a surrounding that otherwise would have suggested other
forms 51. In the final analysis it will be the interplay of all three factors, which must lead to a diversity of
entrepeneurship, and one that can only be analysed with the help of comparative studies.
                                                                
51 One useful field study for this research agenda is Laurence J.C. Ma and Biao Xiang, “ Native Place, Migration and the
Emergence of Peasant enclaves in Beijing”,  The China Quarterly 155 (1998) pp. 546-581.
Table I : Firms: Number, age, and sector 
Interviewed in: 1993 1996 1997 1999 Total Percent
Firms:
Total 12 37 28 27 104
Per cent 11.5 35.6 27 26 100
Year of registration
Before 1982 1 14 5 0 20 19.2
1983 - 1991 7 16 13 9 45 43.2
1992 - 1999 4 7 10 18 39 37.6
Average age of firm at the time 4 18   11 ¾ 5 ½ 10
Interviewed
Sector:
Primary sector 2 14 3 8 27 26.0
  -   Coal and -processing 1 7 2 1 11
  -   Food processing 1 5       -- 5 11
Manufacturing    -- 14 7 4 25 24.0
Service 10 9 18 15 52 50.0
  -   Old service 3 6 8 9 26
  -   New service 7 3 10 6 26
Ownership registration: 
SOE 1 18 10 3 32 30.7
TVE       -- 5 4            -- 9   8.6
Collective           6 2 4 4 16 15.4
Gufen         -- 3 4 7 14 13.5
Private 4 6 6 13 29 27.8
Joint venture 1 3 --            -- 4   3.8
A TVE
 “NEW STYLE”
Construction Co. Trading Co. Ltd. Electric Co Village Village
“Economic 
 negotiation 
committee”
SOE PROVINCE TVE LOCALPRIVATE
Financial capital
Investment:
Electricity
connection to
main power line
Land, old
factory:
80 out of 304
employees
Social capital, 
guanxi influence
brokering
67% 6% 27%
The first 3 shareholders nominate 6, the village 1 and the village government’s “Economic negotiation committee” 2 members to 
the board of directors.
Firm Board of Directors: 9
people according to shares
DEVELOPMENT OF A TYPICAL CHINESE PRIVATE COMPANY
YEAR
ACTIVITY
INPUT
1986 1989 1991 1992 TO 1999
Mr. Wang 
starts cloth
trade
Starts a shop
for household 
appliances
Representative
for Robert Bosch,
car electronic 
car repair
Plus hotels, 
catering firm, 
recreational 
facilities, plus 
construction 
company in 
Australia
5,000 RMB
savings
Recruitment of
a railway engineer
as manager. 
Recruitment of 
Technicians
Access to bank loans
70 mln. Shares for
99 employees
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